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THE USES AND ABUSES OF INCUMBENCY:
PEOPLE v. OHRENSTEIN AND THE LIMITS
OF INHERENT LEGISLATIVE POWER
JAMES A. GARDNER*
1D ARELY have elected legislators been held in lower esteem by the
lXvoting public than they are now. The crisis in the savings and loan
industry and the ethical lapses of the so-called "Keating Five"' are only
the latest events to reinforce a growing public perception that legislators
are single-minded seekers of reelection whose desire for job security far
exceeds their desire or ability to fulfill the public duties with which they
are entrusted. Recent public dissatisfaction has taken the form of re-
newed calls for campaign finance reform2 and for higher legally binding
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A.
1980, Yale University; J.D. 1984, University of Chicago. The author wishes to thank Jay
Mootz, Barry Stern and John Egnal for reviewing earlier drafts.
1. The Keating Five are five United States Senators who were accused of improperly
intervening with federal banking industry regulators dealing with a savings and loan insti-
tution run by Charles H. Keating, Jr. The Senators' intervention was allegedly prompted
by Keating's large contributions to their reelection campaigns. See, e.g., Magnuson, You
Sold Your Office, Time, Nov. 26, 1990, at 35 (describing the senators' involvement with
Keating). These charges were brought before the Senate Ethics Committee, see Down the
Road. The Keating Five, 48 Cong. Q. W. Rep., at 1855 (June 16, 1990); Keating Five Ask
Exoneration As Panel's Hearings End, 49 Cong. Q. W. Rep., at 169 (Jan. 19, 1991), which
found that one Senator had violated Senate ethical rules, and that the other four had used
poor judgment. See Berke, Ethics Unit Singles Out Cranston, Chides 4 Others in S & L
Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al, col. 1. This episode has taken part against a
larger backdrop of massive bank failures in the savings and loan industry that have re-
quired huge federal appropriations to cover insured deposits. Congress has taken much of
the blame for these events. See, eg., Greenwald, Warning: Further - and Maybe Bigger
- Federal Bailouts Ahead, Time, Dec. 18, 1989, at 40 (stating that requirements designed
to aid the savings and loan industry have pushed many into extinction); Partisan Knives
Are Drawn as Thrift Crisis Builds, 48 Cong. Q. W. Rep., at 1937 (June 23, 1990) (describ-
ing Democrat's assaults on the federal administration's mishandling of the savings and
loan crisis).
2. In 1990, Congress responded to public pressure for campaign finance reform, but
failed to enact legislation. The House of Representatives passed the Campaign Cost Re-
duction and Reform Act of 1990, H.R. 5400, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), and the Senate
passed the Senatorial Election Campaign Act of 1989, S. 137, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990), but neither bill became law. See generally Campaign Finance Measures, 48 Cong.
Q. W. Rep., at 2617 (Aug. 11, 1990) (summarizing provisions of these bills). Even this
ultimately unfruitful effort was accomplished only with the greatest difficulty. See
Magnuson, Search and Seizure on Capitol Hill, Time, Mar. 7, 1988, at 23.
In New York, calls for campaign finance reform have come not only from the public,
see Editorial, Campaign Reform: The Next Moves, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1989, at 26, col. I,
but from a variety of official bodies as well. See, e.g., State-City Comm'n on Integrity in
Gov't, 1 Rep. and Recommendations, at 29-39 (Jan. 1987) (commission established
jointly by Governor of New York and Mayor of New York City recommends legislation
to eliminate opportunities for abuse and corruption under present system of campaign
finance); State of New York, Comm'n on Gov't Integrity, Campaign Financing: Prelimi-
nary Rep. (Dec. 21, 1987) (recommending creation of an independent campaign financing
enforcement agency, detailed disclosure of contributions, public financing of elections,
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ethical standards3-measures that seem to be readily forthcoming when
they involve restraining the executive branch, but which legislatures at
all levels of government have bitterly resisted imposing on themselves.4
and limits on direct contributions from private interests); State of New York, Comm'n on
Gov't Integrity, The Albany Money Machine: Campaign Financing for New York State
Legislative Races (Aug. 1, 1988) (calling for immediate implementation of the recommen-
dations of the Commission in December 1987 and recommending further limits on con-
tributions to party committees).
For examples of calls for campaign finance reform in other states, see Mydans, Civics
101 on Tape in Arizona, or, "We All Have Our Prices," N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1991, at A l,
col. 1 (Arizona); California Says Yes to Campaign Reform, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1988, at
A26, col. 1 (California); Comment, State Campaign Finance Law: An Overview and a Call
for Reform, 55 Mo. L. Rev. 937, 949-60 (1990) (Missouri); Verniero, Campaign Finance
Laws Need Changes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, § 12NJ, at 14, col. 1 (New Jersey).
3. See, e.g., Cashing In On Ethics, Time, July 3, 1989, at 16; Paddock, Legislature
Overwhelmingly Approves Major Ethics Bill, L.A. Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at A3, col. 1
(stating that the public's desire for higher ethical standards is evident by a Los Angeles
Times poll indicating that most voters view legislators as corrupt); Lynn, Panel, Ending
Long Inquiry, Urges Legislation on Ethics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1990, at B4, col. 1 (stat-
ing that the New York State Commission on Government Integrity has stressed the need
for ethical reforms); Suro, Powerful Texas Politician is Indicted, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1990, at 9, col. 4 (in her successful 1990 campaign for governor of Texas, Ann Richards
campaigned on a promise for tougher state ethics legislation). In New York, limited
ethics legislation was enacted in 1987 after a bitter fight. See Ethics in Government Act,
1987 N.Y. Laws, ch. 813; Governmental Accountability, Audit and Internal Control
Act, 1987 N.Y. Laws, ch. 814.
4. For example, the Senate recently exempted itself from legislation imposing gov-
ernment-wide limits on outside income and employment. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989,
§ 601, 103 Stat. 1716, 1761-62 (amending § 505 of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5
U.S.C. § 505 (1988)). See also House, Senate Differ Markedly on Pay-and-Ethics Pack-
age, 47 Cong. Q. W. Rep., at 3129 (Nov. 18, 1989) (describing failure of Senate to ap-
prove House-passed plan combining salary increases with ethics rules). In the same
legislation, Congress imposed a permanent ban on certain types of lobbying of executive
branch agencies by former executive branch officials, but imposed only a one-year ban on
similar lobbying of Congress by former congressional employees. See Ethics Reform Act
of 1989, § 101(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1716-17, 1719 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. I
1989)).
Congress has routinely exempted itself from good-government legislation. Beginning
with the earliest civil service legislation, Congress professionalized and eliminated pa-
tronage in the executive branch, but not in the legislative branch. See Civil Service Act,
ch. 27, §§ 2, 14, 22 Stat. 403, 404, 407 (1883); Civil Service Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
454, § 2302, 92 Stat. 1111, 1114 (1978). Similarly, section 9(a) of the Hatch Act banned
executive branch personnel from attempting to influence elections and from taking an
active role in political campaigns, but imposed no such limits on congressional personnel.
See Hatch Act, ch. 410, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1148 (1939) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 7324). Congress has even exempted itself from equal employment opportunity legisla-
tion applicable to government hiring and firing. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1988).
As this work was going to press, the Senate passed a measure setting limits on honora-
ria that senators would be allowed to earn. The measure was accompanied by a pay raise
designed in part to supplement lost future income. The measure also eased somewhat the
existing restrictions on receiving gifts. See 49 Cong. Q. W. Rep., at 2128-29 (Aug. 3,
1991). The President signed the bill on August 14, 1991. See 49 Cong. Q. W. Rep., at
2396 (Aug. 31, 1991); Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-90,
105 Stat. 447 (1991). Shortly after passage of the bill, the Senate Minority Leader intro-
duced a resolution that would lift the new law's cap on donations of honoraria that could
be made on a Senator's behalf. See 49 Cong. Q. W. Rep., at 2222 (Aug 10, 1991).
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Last year, public dissatisfaction reached such a pitch that voters in three
states approved constitutional amendments limiting the number of terms
a legislator can serve.5 The message was clear: after a certain amount of
time in office, legislators can be presumed to harm the public good more
than they help it.
In this environment, it is astonishing that the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the state's highest court, has in a recent decision not only blocked a
criminal prosecution of legislators who misused their office for political
gain, but essentially ruled that such misuse is a legitimate legislative
function. In People v. Ohrenstein,6 the Minority Leader of the New York
Senate was charged with theft of state property for using public funds to
hire aides whose principal duties consisted of working on the reelection
campaigns of several Senate Democrats. The court found that these ex-
penditures had been specifically authorized by state law and that they
constituted a legitimate exercise of legislative power; consequently, the
court dismissed the most important counts of the indictment.
The hiring by legislatures and individual legislators of staff members,
and the determination of their duties and responsibilities, although no-
where specifically authorized by constitutional grant, is generally
thought nonetheless to be a necessary and legitimate legislative function.
The prosecution of the Minority Leader in Ohrenstein for using his staff
in a particular way thus raises some important and sensitive questions
concerning the nature and scope of inherent7 legislative power-ques-
tions with which the Court of Appeals failed meaningfully to grapple.
This Article argues that the court's analysis is fundamentally flawed in
that it overlooks important structural limitations on the scope of inherent
legislative power implicit in a constitutional scheme of representative de-
mocracy. These limitations prevent a legislature from defining the scope
of its own functions so broadly as to include campaigning for reelection.
A useful place to begin an analysis of the Ohrenstein decision is with a
reminder of why abuse of incumbency is viewed so negatively in a de-
mocracy; Part I briefly discusses the reasons behind the American dis-
taste for such practices. Part II examines the court's opinion in
5. The states were California, Colorado and Oklahoma. See Toner, Quayle Leads
Drive to Limit Congress Terms, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1990, at B12, col. 3.
6. 77 N.Y.2d 38, 565 N.E.2d 493, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1990) [hereinafter Ohrenstein
III].
7. The word "inherent" is used here interchangeably with "implied" and "inciden-
tal" to describe powers conferred upon legislatures by virtue of a constitutional grant of
general legislative power. Some legislative powers may be implied from or incidental to
express constitutional grants of specific powers; for example, the Supreme Court has
found that the Constitution grants to Congress a spending power that is implied from or
incidental to the expressly granted power to raise revenue. See United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1936). The powers discussed here, however, are implied from or inci-
dental to the grant of legislative power in the first instance, rather than the grant of a
specific enumerated power. Such powers are therefore "inherent" aspects of legislative
power, even though they may also properly be viewed as "implied" or "incidental" in
their derivation.
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Ohrenstein and the reasoning leading to the court's conclusion. Part III
reviews the concept of inherent legislative power, argues that it is subject
to significant constitutional limitations under our system of government,
and concludes that campaigning for office is not a part of the legislative
power. Finally, Part IV examines the question of whether any limita-
tions on inherent legislative power are justiciable in light of Speech or
Debate Clause immunity and the political question doctrine, and con-
cludes that neither of these doctrines poses an obstacle to judicial review.
I. ABUSE OF INCUMBENCY
A. Methods of Abuse
Among the colorful traditions of American politics, there are two
main types of activity by which incumbents have abused their powers as
elected officials. The first type involves the use of official power for pri-
vate enrichment, whether for the benefit of the official or the official's
friends and relations. This type of abuse generally takes the form of
graft-for example, the personal use of public property or the obtaining
of personal business opportunities through government contacts or infor-
mation 8 -or patronage, which involves the use of governmental influence
to obtain jobs or business opportunities for associates, friends, and rela-
tives.9 This type of incumbency abuse has been condemned at least since
the time of Aristotle, who defined a tyrant as one who governs according
to his personal advantage rather than the common good.10
The second principal form of incumbency abuse occurs when officials
use the governmental resources at their disposal for the purpose of main-
taining themselves in power. In extreme cases this type of abuse might
take the form of outlawing political dissent altogether or stealing elec-
8. A classic explanation of graft is that offered by George Washington Plunkitt, a
boss during New York City's Tammany Hall era:
[Miany of our men have grown rich in politics. I have myself. I've made a big
fortune out of the game, and I'm gettin' richer every day ....
Just let me explain by examples. My party's in power in the city, and it's goin'
to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well, I'm tipped off, say, that
they're going to lay out a new park at a certain place.
I see my opportunity and I take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land
I can in the neighborhood. Then the board of this or that makes its plan public,
and there is a rush to get my land, which nobody cared particular for before.
Ain't it perfectly honest to charge a good price and make a profit on my invest-
ment and foresight? Of course, it is....
G.W. Plunkitt, Honest Graft and Dishonest Graft, in The City Boss in America 149, 149
(Alexander B. Callow, ed. 1976).
9. See, eg., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976) (discharge of public employees
solely because of partisan nonaffiliation and failure to obtain sponsorship of party leader);
Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1970)
(taxpayer suit alleging patronage practices in Chicago and Cook County), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 909 (1971). For a recent, detailed study of patronage in Chicago, see C.G.
Bowman, "We Don't Want Anybody Anybody Sent" The Death of Patronage Hiring in
Chicago, 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 57 (1991).
10. See Aristotle, Politics, Book III, ch. vii (Ernest Barker, trans. 1978).
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tions through vote fraud. Other examples might include using govern-
ment property-cars, planes, employees, etc.-as private campaign
resources. Of course this type of abuse is related to the first: one cannot
plunder the public till or dispense patronage unless one holds office. Still,
in our society this politically oriented type of incumbency abuse is often
viewed as worse than the private enrichment type because it deprives
individuals of their most basic liberty, the right of self-government.
A fundamental aspect of American societal self-understanding is that
the choice of who shall govern, and on what terms, is one for the people,
and not for the government; indeed, as Jefferson wrote, whenever a gov-
ernment becomes unsatisfactory, "it is the right of the people to alter or
to abolish it."1 When the government uses its power to dictate or to
improperly influence decisions about who gets to hold office, this basic
right of political self-determination is undermined. Madison viewed the
overcoming of this dilemma as the central problem of constitutional
craftsmanship: "you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." 2 For the
political heirs of men who pledged their "lives, [their] fortunes, and
[their] sacred honour"' 3 to the pursuit of political freedom and self-deter-
mination, there can be little doubt that the government's abuse of the
powers of incumbency for the purpose of perpetuating its own power is
one of the worst possible offenses against the polity.
B. The Model of Equality of Political Opportunity
Since, as will be shown below, the Ohrenstein case involves this latter
and more serious form of incumbency abuse, it is worth taking a moment
to define more precisely what amounts to political abuse of the powers of
incumbency.
Imbedded in our political and constitutional culture is what might be
called a model of equality of political opportunity. According to this
model, individual citizens are entitled to an equal opportunity to con-
ceive and to implement their own visions of what American society
should be. They may do this by thinking about politics and society; by
talking to others and attempting to persuade them; by appealing to the
government to implement particular measures or to take certain actions;
by supporting and voting for like-minded candidates for public office;
and by running for public office themselves and attempting to garner
electoral support. According to the model, no individual, group, or idea
is privileged; all may compete on an equal footing for success in the polit-
ical arena.
This model is rooted generally in the concept of republican democracy
as a system of government in which politically equal individuals join to-
11. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
12. The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
13. The Declaration of Independence para. 31 (U.S. 1776).
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gether to practice self-government by choosing freely the identity of their
rulers and the scope of the powers those rulers may exercise. The model
is thus largely implicit in the form of government Americans have consti-
tutionally created. Nevertheless, explicit evidence of the existence of the
model can be found throughout the Constitution. For example, the equal
protection clause has been held to establish a regime of one person-one
vote, 14 and to require the equal distribution of the franchise where it is
granted.' 5 The first amendment guarantees the right to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances,16 and has been held to establish a
free marketplace of ideas.17 The thirteenth amendment abolishes slavery,
and with it the absolute political disenfranchisement of any United States
citizen. The fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fourth amendments se-
verely restrict the ability of the state or federal governments to deprive
citizens of the right to vote. The Guarantee Clause assures that the states
will maintain republican forms of government. 18 All of these provisions,
taken together, implement a model of equal political opportunity implicit
in republican democratic self-government under which all citizens are
entitled to participate in the political process in pursuit of their personal
goals and aspirations and can expect to compete in the political arena
solely on the basis of their ideas and qualifications.
Although the equality contemplated by this model is ambitious, it is
nevertheless incomplete: nothing about the model contemplates equality
of political outcomes-that all groups or ideas, for example, will be rep-
resented--or equality in the resources needed to achieve a particular
political agenda. Some citizens may be more creative political thinkers
than others, or more persuasive communicators, or more effective lobby-
ists, fundraisers, or campaigners. Consequently, inequality in the distri-
bution of political ideas, or in the distribution of resources necessary to
advance those ideas, does not offend the model so long as these inequali-
ties reflect differing attributes and preferences among the citizenry. In
this respect, the model takes the abilities and resources of citizens as
given; equality of political opportunity means the ability to use to the
same extent as anyone else the abilities and resources one was born with
or has acquired. 9 For this reason, the model can be viewed as one part
14. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
15. See id. at 565; accord Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 n.25 (1980) (right to
participate "equally with other qualified voters"); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397
U.S. 50, 55 (1970) (right "to participate on an equal footing in the electoral process").
16. See U.S. Const. amend I.
17. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
19. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (no constitutional violation
for federal government to withdraw funding for abortions even though only way for poor
women to exercise their right to an abortion is with such assistance); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (by denying funds for abortion, the state has imposed no restriction
on access to abortions that was not already there); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51-54
(1976) (per curiam) (first amendment prohibits restrictions on speech individuals can
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of a general constitutional regime that has been aptly described as one of
"negative" rights;2' it implements a system where everyone is equally
free from government interference in the pursuit of political goals. Poli-
tics, in this view, is for the people, and governing is for the government;
the people's elected representatives may not put a thumb on the electoral
scale to tip the balance toward a favored party, candidate, or idea.
From this perspective, it is plain that the use for political purposes of
the powers available to incumbents offends the model of equal political
opportunity. The enactment of laws that erect obstacles to the candida-
cies of challengers, for example, offends the model by using the coercive
powers of government to influence the outcomes of elections. In such
cases, incumbents rely on their legislative powers rather than their appeal
as candidates, and gain an unfair competitive advantage not available to
challengers. The courts have understandably been quite hostile to such
uses of government power, striking down laws that make it unduly diffi-
cult for challengers to gain a spot on the ballot,2 or that relegate chal-
lengers to less favorable or less visible spots on the ballot.'
The model is no less offended when incumbents use the physical or
financial resources available to them as government officials for their own
election campaigns. To get elected, one must campaign for office; to
campaign for office effectively, one must have access to the resources
needed to travel, pay campaign workers, print and mail campaign litera-
ture, advertise in the various media, and get out the vote on election
day.23 It is one thing for candidates for office to use whatever resources
they can marshal as private citizens in conducting their election cam-
make using their own resources); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 23-24 (1973) (property tax-based school financing does not violate the Constitution
even though the poor will necessarily have worse schools). This scheme is open to criti-
cism for taking as "natural," and therefore an appropriate constitutional baseline, what
may really be an arbitrary and socially perpetuated status quo. See Bandes, The Negative
Constitution. A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271, 2300 (1990); L. Tribe, Constitutional
Choices 243-44 (1985).
20. See Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L Rev. 864,
864-67 (1986); Kriemer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in the
Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1324-26 (1984); Appleton, Beyond the Limits of
Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental
Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 721, 734-40 (1981).
21. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1968).
22. See McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1167 (8th Cir. 1980); Sangmeister v. Wood-
ard, 565 F.2d 460, 467 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 939 (1978); Gould v. Grubb,
14 Cal. 3d 661, 676, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 387, 536 P.2d 1337, 1347 (1975); Holtzman v.
Power, 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 1025, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909, aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d
666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970). But see Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D.
Mass. 1976).
23. The analysis advanced in this Article rests on the assumption that money is a
significant factor in election campaigns. This phenomenon has been well documented.
See H. Alexander, Financing Politics 20-23 (3d ed. 1984); D. Adamany & G. Agree,
Political Money 2-3 (1975); see generally Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in
Congressional Elections, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 469 (1978); Palda, The Effect of Expendi-
ture on Political Success, 18 J.L. & Econ. 745 (1975).
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
paigns and to compete using those resources on an equal footing with
other candidates. But it is quite another thing for candidates who hap-
pen to be incumbents to use the resources of the government-resources
which were extracted by force of law from the electorate and which are
not available to other candidates-to assist their own reelection cam-
paigns. Use of such resources gives incumbents access to the resources of
government in addition to their own, an advantage that can be tanta-
mount to direct government intervention on their behalf.24
It is important to stress that the advantage incumbents gain by using
government powers at their disposal in pursuit of reelection is not prob-
lematic merely because it offends some abstract notion of fair play in the
election game. On the contrary, it is problematic because it upsets rela-
tionships at the heart of the notion of republican self-rule on which our
system of government is based. Popular self-rule means, in large part,
that the people choose the individuals who will represent them as govern-
ment officials. For such self-rule to be free, the people's choices must be
freely made. When the government uses its powers to improve or ob-
struct the fortunes of particular candidates, it deprives the people of the
free choice among candidates that belongs to them alone. Such actions
by the government introduce an element of nonconsensual rule-of des-
potism-into the system of self-rule inherent in republican democracy.
Thus, abuse of the powers of incumbency by elected officials, at least in
its more extreme manifestations, ultimately threatens democracy itself.
C. Abuse of Incumbency in New York State
Against this backdrop, many common practices of the New York Leg-
islature look distinctly suspicious. Generally speaking, the legislature
has never been a paragon of ethical behavior. Three of the last four
Speakers of the Assembly, for example, were indicted while in office: the
current Speaker is now under indictment for federal mail fraud, and two
of his predecessors were indicted on charges of vote fraud and patronage
abuse, respectively. 25 According to one count, since 1987 more incum-
bent New York legislators have been indicted than have been defeated at
the polls. 26
Many apparently widespread practices of the legislature fall into the
first category of incumbency abuse discussed above. In recent years, leg-
islators have been accused of padding the state payroll with no-show
workers; hiring friends, relatives and business associates as committee
staff; spending public money lavishly on their offices and on other perqui-
sites such as limousines; and becoming involved in the representation of
24. Several states have enacted legislation based on the view that access to state re-
sources gives incumbents an unfair advantage. See infra note 159.
25. See Kolbert, Indictments: Just a Part of the Albany Routine, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23,
1990, § 4, at 12, col. 1.
26. See id.
[Vol. 60
USES AND ABUSES OF INCUMBENCY
clients who do business with state agencies.27
Other practices fall into the second category of incumbency abuse.
Several influential legislators have been criticized for accepting large
campaign contributions from individuals or entities who are subject to
state regulation by committees on which these legislators sit.28 In 1987, a
commission appointed by Governor Cuomo found that the state electoral
process was "awash in money," and that significant campaign finance
reforms were needed to prevent the discouragement of less affluent candi-
dates and to eliminate the "vast opportunities for abuse, influence ped-
dling and other improprieties" created by the existing system.29
Finally, and most pertinent here, the legislature has often engaged in
the practice of using legislative staff, employed at public expense, as
workers in the reelection campaigns of incumbents."0 This practice has
been often criticized and occasionally investigated," and public pressure
recently prompted the legislature to set some modest limits on the prac-
tice.3 2 Nevertheless, the decision of the Manhattan District Attorney to
prosecute the Minority Leader represents the first direct challenge ever
mounted to the legality of the practice. The Ohrenstein case is thus the
first in New York State to confront the question of what happens when
27. See e.g., Kolbert, A Legislator Quits as Panel Urges Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1987, at B1, col. 6 (state legislator resigns after admitting to hiring no-show employ-
ees); Editorial, Open the Legislature's Books, N.Y. Post, June 5, 1987, at 22, col. 1 (charg-
ing Senate Majority Leader with unnecessarily renting "posh Fifth Avenue offices" while
downtown state office space "stands empty," and of using "limos and chauffeurs');
Barbanel, Legislature's Payrol" Few "No-Shows," But Patronage Persists, N.Y. Tunes,
Feb. 2, 1987 at B1, col. 2 ("two no-show secretaries on the Assembly payroll, was a
throwback to an earlier era"); Cross & Connell, State Legislature a Hotbed of Patronage.
Cronyism, Albany Times Union, Feb. 8, 1987, at 1 (detailing hiring by legislators of rela-
tives, law partners, political associates and former colleagues); Madden, The Lawyers in
Albany: Lawmaker With 2 Hats, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1987, at Al, col. 5 (some legisla-
tors who are lawyers continue to represent clients appearing before state agencies).
28. See, eg., Gesensway, Ethics Proposal a Compromise of Earlier, Tougher Bill, Al-
bany Times Union, Mar. 18, 1987, at Al (New York State Senator Bruno has ties to the
industry his committee regulates); see generally Sack, In Albany, Big Donors Follow Party
in Control, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1990, at 26.
29. State-City Comm'n on Integrity in Gov't, 1 Rep. and Recommendations, at 30-31
(Jan. 1987).
30. See generally N.Y. State Comm'n on Gov't Integrity, Evening the Odds-" The Need
to Restrict Unfair Incumbent Advantage (Oct. 1989); Report of the N.Y. State Blue Rib-
bon Comm'n to Review Legislative Practices in Relation to Political Campaign Activities
of Legislative Employees (May 1988); N.Y. State Senate Research Serv.: Task Force on
Critical Problems, Political Campaign Activity--The Use of Legislative Staff and Re-
sources: A Comparative Analysis of Laws, Rules, Regulations and Court Decisions (Jan.
1988).
31. The Brooklyn District Attorney investigated the practice in 1985, but declined to
take legal action; she urged the Legislature to take legislative action instead. See People
v. Ohrenstein, 153 A.D.2d 342, 363, 549 N.Y.S.2d 962, 974 (1st Dept. 1989) [hereinafter
Chrenstein II], aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 38, 565 N.E.2d 493, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1990). See also
supra note 30.
32. See New York Legislature, Concurrent Resolution 812, quoted in Ohrenstein 11,
supra note 31, at 364, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 975; infra note 186.
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the legislature takes direct legislative action authorizing its members to
use public resources in their efforts to keep themselves in office.
II. THE OHRENSTEIN CASE
A. Background
In 1986, when the events that are the subject of the Court of Appeals
decision took place, Manfred Ohrenstein was a Democratic State Senator
representing a district in lower Manhattan, and was the Minority Leader
of the New York Senate. The post of Minority Leader is of course filled
by a Senator of the political party constituting the largest minority party
in the Senate. The Leader is elected to the office by the Senators who are
members of his party. Likewise, the members of the majority party in
the Senate, currently the Republican Party, choose a Majority Leader."
Although nothing in the New York Constitution or state law requires
Senate business to be conducted in any particular way, the Majority and
Minority Leaders have traditionally wielded enormous influence in the
legislature. Like their counterparts in the United States Congress, the
Majority and Minority leaders play extensive roles in developing legisla-
tive programs for their respective parties, setting the legislative agenda,
negotiating bills, making committee assignments, and selecting Senate
employees.34 The Majority and Minority Leaders also negotiate among
themselves the Senate budget, which is then distributed along party lines.
Each Leader subsequently allocates to Senators of his party funds to be
used for administrative expenses, including staff salaries and mailing
costs. 35 The hours, salaries, and duties of Senate staff are determined by
the individual Senators for whom the employees work.36
Under Senator Ohrenstein, the office of Minority Leader became some-
thing of a nerve center for virtually all activities conducted by Senators of
the Democratic Party. While some members of Ohrenstein's staff per-
formed functions typical of aides to any other Senator, such as drafting
legislation and providing services to constituents, 7 the majority of
Ohrenstein's many employees were assigned to the Senate Minority Con-
ference.38 The Minority Conference is an association of Democratic Sen-
ators formed for two purposes. First, it develops and coordinates the
implementation of a Democratic legislative agenda for the Senate.3 9 To
this end, the Conference staff, under the direction of the Minority
33. See Kolbert, Marino of L.L Appears to Win Top Senate Post, N.Y. Times, Sept.
15, 1988, at B2, col. 1.
34. See Ohrenstein 11, supra note 31, at 348-49, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 350, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
38. See id.
39. See People v. Ohrenstein, 139 Misc. 2d 909, 913, 531 N.Y.S.2d 942, 945 (1988)
[hereinafter Ohrenstein 1], aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 38, 565 N.E.2d 493, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744
(1990).
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Leader, researches and drafts legislation, writes newsletters, and assists
new Democratic Senators in learning the legislative process."
The second function of the Minority Conference is to provide support
of a more overtly political nature to Democratic Senators and to Demo-
cratic candidates challenging incumbent Republicans. In this role, con-
ference staff members, under the direction of a Steering Committee
headed by the Minority Leader,4 assess the political impact of proposed
legislation, provide demographic and political intelligence about election
districts, and act as liaison between the Minority Conference and each
district's political and business leaders.4 2
Finally, during election campaigns, the Steering Committee supervises
Democratic campaigns for the Senate. It selects candidates to run
against incumbent Republicans, targets particular districts for special
campaign efforts, sets campaign budgets, approves the campaign man-
ager, and supervises the formulation of campaign strategy.4 3 The trial
court in Ohrenstein found that the Steering Committee is able to exercise
considerable influence over Democratic campaigns for the Senate by vir-
tue of its "control over two sources of material assistance to selected can-
didates: funds of the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee [a
campaign finance organization of the New York Democratic Party], and
the assignment of Senate minority staff to work in campaigns."" Thus,
the Minority Leader sits at the center of a web of activities and resources
designed to advance the political and legislative agenda of the Demo-
cratic Party and its members and incumbent legislators.
In the 1986 election, the Minority Conference decided to target several
districts for substantial campaign assistance. Accordingly, the Confer-
ence reassigned existing staff and hired new staff to work on the targeted
campaigns; these individuals were paid with public funds allocated from
the Senate operational budget. Ten staffers already on the Senate payroll
in other capacities were shifted to work on the campaigns. Twenty-six
other individuals were hired to work on the campaigns; eighteen of these
were removed from the payroll after the election, while eight were re-
tained on the payroll in a legislative capacity during the 1987 legislative
session. In addition, three individuals were hired by the Conference but
performed no duties of any kind-the so-called "no-show" employees.4
In 1987, a Manhattan grand jury indicted Ohrenstein and three other
Senators, charging them, in substance, with over six hundred counts of
larceny, theft of services, and conspiracy." These charges were based on
40. See Ohrenstein II, supra note 31, at 350, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 966; Ohrenstein I, supra
note 39, at 913, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
41. See Ohrenstein II, supra note 31, at 351, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
42. See Ohrenstein 1, supra note 39, at 913-15, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46.
43. See id. at 914, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
44. Id.; see also Ohrenstein II, supra note 31, at 351-52, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (discuss-
ing Steering Committee influence).
45. See Ohrenstein I, supra note 39, at 915, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
46. See Ohrenstein I, supra note 31, at 353, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
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the theory that paying public employees to work on private reelection
campaigns was a theft of public property. The defendants moved to dis-
miss the indictment on a variety of grounds including separation of pow-
ers, legislative immunity, political question, and due process. The trial
court dismissed approximately a third of the counts, principally for lack
of justiciability.47 On appeal, the Appellate Division48 dismissed all
counts except those relating to no-show employees.49 The court's ruling
rested on justiciability and due process grounds.50
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division ruling, but took
a very different approach from that of the courts below. It parted com-
pany with the lower courts at the outset, declining to address any consti-
tutional questions and holding that the case could be resolved on
statutory grounds alone.5 The court thus held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that New York's larceny and theft of services statutes
simply did not reach Ohrenstein's conduct, except to the extent that he
hired no-show employees who did nothing to earn their pay. However,
the court's analysis is statutory in only the most superficial way; underly-
ing its conclusion are significant assumptions about the constitutional
powers of the legislature.
The court's reasoning proceeded as follows. Under the New York
Constitution, the legislature has the power to appropriate funds and to
set the wages and hours of state employees. 2 Section 6 of New York's
Legislative Law implements this authority by empowering the Minority
Leader to "appoint such employees to assist him in the performance of
his duties as may be authorized and provided for in the legislative appro-
priation bill."53 Section 6 thus places no restriction on the uses to which
such employees may be put by the Minority Leader, merely referring
such decisions to the relevant legislative appropriation bill.54
In 1986, the relevant appropriation bill authorized the Minority
Leader to spend certain sums to hire staff, but provided only that these
sums were to be used for "personal service of employees and for tempo-
rary and expert services of legislative and program operations ... [and]
of standing committees."55 Thus, the court held, the legislature had by
statute expressly authorized the Minority Leader to hire staff to perform
47. See id. at 354, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
48. In New York, the trial court is known as the Supreme Court. The intermediate
court of appeals is known as the Appellate Division. The state's highest court is the
Court of Appeals.
49. See id. at 374-75, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 981-82.
50. See id. at 368-69, 374-75, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78, 981-82.
51. See Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 46, 565 N.E.2d at 496, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
52. See id.
53. Id. (citing Legislative Law § 6(2)).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 47, 565 N.E.2d at 497, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
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such duties as he saw fit to assign, including working on election
campaigns.
The court rejected the District Attorney's contention that this statu-
tory authorization should be read narrowly to refer only to typically
"governmental activities" like drafting bills and performing constituent
services.56 The court instead pointed out that the performance of "polit-
ical" activities by Senate staff was "considered an inherent part of the job
of an elected representative;""7 that the legislature was "aware of the fact
that its members were using staff employees in political campaigns;" 8
and that the legislature "chose to place no restrictions on the practice." 9
In short, the Minority Leader had open-ended statutory authorization
"to appoint staff members, to determine the terms and conditions of their
employment and to assign duties and the hours of work as [he] deemed
necessary to fulfill the broad range of legislative duties."'6 If the Minor-
ity Leader determined that working full-time on the reelection campaign
of an incumbent Democratic Senator was within the "broad range of leg-
islative duties," the court was unwilling to say otherwise.
From here, it is a short step to the conclusion that Ohrenstein could
not be criminally prosecuted on theft charges. The court reasoned that
Ohrenstein's conduct was not specifically prohibited by any law,6' but
what it really seemed to mean was that the conduct could not be the
subject of a criminal prosecution because it was expressly authorized by
law. As the dissent pointed out, penal statutes generally "do not pro-
scribe specific practices or methods... [and the] myriad ways in which
the improper use of governmental funds may be accomplished precludes
such specificity." 62 Elsewhere in the opinion, the majority seemed to rec-
ognize this and to rely implicitly on a due process theory: "at the time
the defendants acted, their conduct was not prohibited in any manner,
nor could they have known that they were subject to criminal prosecu-
tion for their acts."6  Alternatively-and the court's reasoning is quite
opaque on this point-the court might have thought that an explicit stat-
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 49, 565 N.E.2d at 498, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 47, 565 N.E.2d at 497, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
61. See id. at 49, 52, 565 N.E.2d at 498, 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 751.
62. Id. at 58, 565 N.E.2d at 503, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 754 (Simons, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 52, 565 N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 751. Although the court seemed to
find the law authorizing Ohrenstein's conduct to be constitutional, it could have ruled the
same way even if it had found the law unconstitutional. That is, Ohrenstein's reliance on
even an unconstitutional statute might have shielded him from later prosecution under
New York Law, see N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20(2) (McKinney 1987) (no criminal liability
for conduct engaged in "under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law,
constitute an offense, [when] such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of
the law contained in... a statute"), and possibly also under the Due Process Clause. See
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see eg., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-40 (1959) (due
process forbids conviction based on refusal to answer questions of state investigative com-
mission in reliance upon commission's assurance that privilege applied). On the other
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utory authorization to perform a specific act carves out an exception
from general prohibitory statutes like the theft laws. In any event, the
court concluded by affirming the dismissal of all counts relating to the
paying of staff for work performed in election campaigns.64
The court's ruling turns decisively on its interpretation of the two stat-
utes which it found to authorize the Minority Leader to hire staff mem-
bers and to assign them to campaign for incumbent legislators. This
interpretation is a curious one. The statutes did not say: "The Minority
Leader may hire staff to work on senatorial election campaigns."
Rather, the statutes spoke only vaguely of the "duties" of legislators and
the "personal service" of their employees. Had the court felt the slightest
doubt about the propriety of legislators using public funds to get them-
selves reelected, it could have adopted the narrowing construction of-
fered by the District Attorney and held that, in the absence of a specific
indication to the contrary, staff duties and services would be taken to
mean those relating to the legislative process rather than the campaign
process.65
Instead, the court seemed to go out of its way to hold that legislators
are entitled to construe the scope of their official duties to include getting
themselves reelected and using their staffs to help them do it. Indeed, the
court went further: the legislature, it held, may by law define its legisla-
hand, a criminal defendant's reliance on a statute must generally be reasonable to provide
a defense against prosecution. See Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b) (1985).
64. The court also affirmed the ruling of the court below that the defendants would
have to stand trial on the counts relating to no-show employees. The court reasoned that
the indictment did not require it to decide whether a particular staff activity constituted a
proper legislative duty: "Here there is no question as to what 'proper duties' include,
because no matter how they are defined, they must at least include the performance of
some services, of some type, at some time." Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 52, 565
N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 751. This aspect of the court's opinion is in some tension
with its decision dismissing the other counts. If legislators have inherent or unreviewable
power to define the duties of their aides, it is not clear how the court can feel confident
that the no-show aides were doing nothing of any value to the legislators. Moreover, the
court's distinction between aides who do absolutely nothing and those who do almost
nothing is an unpersuasive one. According to the court's reasoning, a legislator who hires
someone to do nothing is stealing, but a legislator who pays someone a year's salary to do
five minutes' work is not. The court's opinion also fails to provide any basis for distin-
guishing a legislator who hires an aide to do campaign work from a legislator who hires
an aide to paint his house.
The court also went on to reject the defendants' argument that the Speech or Debate
Clause of the New York Constitution prohibited prosecution on the no-show counts; a
legislator's immunity under the Clause, the court said, does not protect efforts to defraud
the state by knowingly placing on the payroll employees whose only function is to collect
state salaries. See id. at 54, 565 N.E.2d at 502, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
Upon remand to the trial court, the District Attorney chose to drop all remaining
charges against Senator Ohrenstein rather than proceed solely on the no-show counts.
See Judge Drops Final Charges on Ohrenstein, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1991, at B1, col. 6.
65. New York, like other jurisdictions, follows the rule of construction that statutes
should be interpreted, when possible, to avoid constitutional questions. See Matter of
Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 238, 487 N.E.2d 241, 248, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384, 391 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
[Vol. 60
USES AND ABUSES OF INCUMBENCY
tive functions to include running for reelection, and may expressly au-
thorize its members, as it did here, to use public resources to execute this
aspect of their jobs. This is a significant holding because it suggests that
the legislature has the inherent power to engage in, and even to institu-
tionalize, practices that are ordinarily regarded as an abuse of
incumbency.
Neither the parties nor the court suggested that any specific provision
of the New York Constitution authorized the legislature to take these
actions. On the contrary, the court stressed that the actions are consid-
ered an "inherent part of the job of an elected representative, ' '26 or were
at least so considered by the legislature itself. Thus, the legislative power
to define the scope and nature of its own legislative activities, and to use
public funds to carry out those activities, must in the court's view have
been an aspect of inherent legislative power, for which no specific consti-
tutional authorization was needed.
III. INHERENT LEGISLATIVE POWER
The concept of inherent power is a familiar one in American constitu-
tional discourse. Courts have held, for example, that the powers to con-
duct foreign policy and to guide administrative agencies in their
implementation of the law, although not expressly mentioned in the Con-
stitution, are nevertheless aspects of inherent executive power that the
President has been authorized to wield as chief executive of the United
States.67 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the general consti-
tutional grant of judicial power to the federal courts includes the inherent
power of a court to control its own docket and schedule and to enforce
its orders through contempt sanctions.68
Somewhat less well-known is the corresponding concept of inherent
legislative power-power that the legislature may wield not by virtue of a
specific constitutional grant, but by virtue of having been invested with
the legislative power of the polity. The relative obscurity of inherent leg-
islative power on the federal level is understandable: Congress is a crea-
ture of enumerated powers, and most of the questions regarding the
scope of its powers can be answered by reference either to the lengthy list
of enumerated powers contained in article I of the federal Constitution,
or to the equally lengthy list of express constitutional restrictions on
those powers. State legislatures, on the other hand, typically exercise
general rather than enumerated legislative powers, so virtually all ques-
tions concerning the scope of state legislative power are to some extent
questions of inherent legislative power.
Like its executive and judicial counterparts, the notion of inherent leg-
66. Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 47, 565 N.E.2d at 497, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
67. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
68. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Landis v. North Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
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islative power arises from the constitutional creation of a particular
branch of government and the investing of that branch with associated
powers-in this case, the creation of a legislature and the granting to it of
"legislative power."69 Thus, to the extent that inherent legislative power
exists, it must arise out of notions of what it means in our constitutional
system for an entity to be a legislature and to wield legislative power.
A. The Nature of Legislative Power
What does it mean to have "legislative power," as that term is used in
the American constitutional tradition? A logical starting point to begin
examining this question is the familiar notion of separation of powers.
The Framers, following Montesquieu, theorized that all powers of gov-
ernment fall into one of three categories-legislative, executive or judi-
cial.7 ° According to this account, the differences between these
categories of power amount very simply to the difference between mak-
ing, enforcing and interpreting the law. As Hamilton put it, "[t]he es-
sence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to
prescribe rules for the regulation of the society."71 This definition has
been taken up by the Supreme Court, which has squarely held that "leg-
islative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to
make laws, but not to enforce them."72 Thus, to have legislative power
under our Constitution is to have the power to make laws.
Although this definition is a helpful starting point, it seems to raise as
many questions as it answers. First, what counts as a "law"? It is useless
to know that a legislature can make laws if we lack a clear conception of
what a law is. Second, what kinds of laws is a legislature entitled to
make? It is imperative to know whether there are any limits on the types
or subject matter of laws that accompany the power of making laws.
Third, what counts as "making" law? It is far from self-evident what
activities of a legislature are necessary to create something that may be
acknowledged as a law.
The first question-what constitutes a law-has been for years the sub-
ject of a contentious scholarly debate.7" Nevertheless, the constitutions
that grant the power of making laws generally provide significant gui-
69. See U.S. Const. art. I, § I; N.Y. Const. art. III, § 1.
70. See The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961). See
also Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Bk. XI, ch. 6 (1748) (T. Nugent, trans. 1949)
(on the Constitution of England).
71. The Federalist No. 75, at 450 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
72. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928). The New York Court of
Appeals has interpreted the New York Constitution in the same way. See People ex rel.
Broderick v. Morton, 156 N.Y. 136, 144-45, 50 N.E. 791, 793-94 (1898).
73. This debate is often cast as one between positivists and legal realists. For a classic
confrontation in this context, see Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 614-15 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 631 (1958).
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dance---what H.L.A. Hart called "rules of recognition" 4 --concerning
what should be considered a proper law. For example, the United States
Constitution states clearly that a "law," whatever else it might be, is
something that has been passed by both houses of Congress and signed
by the President, or, if vetoed by the President, repassed by two-thirds of
each house.75
The Constitution likewise provides significant guidance concerning the
second question-what kinds of laws can legislatures make? We are told,
for example, that Congress cannot pass ex post facto laws or bills of at-
tainder, and that it can make no law abridging the freedom of speech, but
that it may pass laws regulating federal elections, creating a uniform
bankruptcy system, and appropriating funds from the treasury.76 While
these provisions are hardly without their ambiguities, they at least pro-
vide useful starting points for thinking about the scope of legislative
power granted by the Constitution.
On the third question, however-what activities constitute "making"
law-the Constitution is largely silent. It does tell us that the law-mak-
ing process involves "bills" and that these bills may be "passed" by a
"vote" consisting of "yeas and nays," but this is scant information on
which to build a model of the legislative process. Where do bills come
from? Who writes them, and utilizing what information, how obtained?
How do legislators cast votes, and what can they do to help them decide
which way to vote on a particular bill? American legislatures have been
forced to answer such questions simply in order to conduct business, and
have often created elaborate institutional mechanisms to support the pro-
cess of making laws. These mechanisms often include, for example, the
creation of numerous legislative committees and the conducting of
broad-scale investigations. It is in justifying these practices, for which
express constitutional authority is rarely available, that the notion of in-
herent legislative power has been most often invoked.
B. The Concept of Ihherent Legislative Power
The United States Constitution makes Congress the repository of "all
legislative powers" of the United States.78 Because the United States
government is one of enumerated rather than general powers, it is natu-
ral to suspect that the sum of congressional power must be contained in
those provisions of the Constitution that grant Congress various forms of
specific authority.79 However, the Supreme Court has occasionally held
74. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 92-93 (1961). "The simplest form of remedy
for the uncertainty of the regime of primary rules is the introduction of... a 'rule of
recognition."' Id.
75. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
76. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; § 8, cl. 4; § 9, cs. 3, 7; amend I.
77. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
78. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
79. Most of these are contained in U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, which lists seventeen spe-
cific congressional powers. These powers are augmented by the Necessary and Proper
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that Congress possesses unenumerated, and therefore implied or inher-
ent, powers by virtue of the grant to it of legislative authority in the first
instance. 80
For example, although Congress may be charged with the power to
make laws, the Court has noted that "[a] legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the condi-
tions which the legislation is intended to affect or change." 81 This need
gives rise to an implied congressional power "to inform itself."82 The
power of the legislature to inform itself gives rise in turn to a constella-
tion of related powers. Congress need not sit passively waiting for perti-
nent information to come its way, but may seek out such information by
conducting investigations. Consequently, the power to "exact testimony
... has long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate,"8 3 and
Congress may therefore call witnesses and request documents. Of
course, witnesses are not always willing to appear or to produce docu-
ments voluntarily, so the congressional power of investigation includes
by implication the power to issue subpoenas. Again, subpoenas are not
always obeyed, and the Supreme Court has therefore held that Congress
has the power to punish contempt.8 4 The inherent congressional power
to punish contempt includes the power to pass a law making contempt of
Congress a crime against the United States, punishable by the executive
branch in a criminal prosecution.85 The Court has also held, at least by
implication, that Congress has the inherent authority to appoint commit-
tees to make its work more manageable, and that those committees may
exercise the investigatory powers of the chamber that creates them.8 6
Clause, a significant expansion of their scope. See id. at cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 353 (1819).
80. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the constitutional doctrine that Congress
possesses only enumerated powers. See The Federalist No. 84, at 513-14 (A. Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824)
(Constitution is "one of enumeration"). The Constitution explicitly grants Congress leg-
islative power in art. I, § 1. The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to
make laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution... all... Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States." Id. at § 8, cl. 18. Thus,
inherent legislative powers might be those that are necessary for Congress to carry into
execution its legislative power. This view, of course, treats the constitutional language
granting legislative power as substantive rather than merely rhetorical or explanatory, an
interpretation consistent with the Court's view of the constitutional grants of executive
and judicial power. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
81. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
82. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953).
83. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 161.
84. See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174-75. Congress also has a more general power to
punish contempts that arise not from the disobeying of subpoenas, but from behavior that
threatens the integrity of the body. See also Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,
228 (1821) (person who attempted to bribe a Representative imprisoned for contempt of
the House). See generally Brand & Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a
Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands
Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 Cath. U.L. Rev. 71, 73-77 (1986).
85. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897); 2 U.S.C. §§ 191-96 (1988).
86. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 122 (1959); Jurney v. McCracken,
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Such committees may receive and prepare reports in the course of con-
ducting committee business.8 7
There are also a variety of inherent legislative powers that the Court
has recognized by implication in cases where the exercise of the power
was not directly challenged as it was in many of the cases involving the
power of Congress to investigate. For example, the Court has said, in
fairly direct language, that Congress has the power to hire aides and to
authorize committees and individual legislators to hire staff because "it is
literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modem legislative
process ... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks
without the help of aides and assistants."88 Such aides, the Court has
said, may be treated for constitutional purposes as legislators' "alter
egos" when they perform functions that are an "integral part" of the
legislative process.8 9
Finally, the Court has expressly approved, without ruling directly on
the constitutionality of, a variety of other congressional activities:
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in
many activities other than... purely legislative [ones]. These include
a wide range of legitimate "errands" performed for constituents, the
making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in se-
curing Government contracts, preparing so-called "newsletters" to
constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Con-
gress. The range of these related activities has grown over the
years.... [These are entirely legitimate activities .... 90
The lower federal courts have added to this list. For example, several
courts have noted the utility of the federal franking statute,9' which al-
lows members of Congress to use the mails free of charge to communi-
cate with their constituents. As one panel put it, the franking privilege is
"a valuable tool in facilitating the performance by individual Members of
Congress of their constitutional duty to communicate with and inform
294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 180 (1927); In re Chap-
man, 166 U.S. at 667-72. See also Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 507 (1975) (holding that legislative activities of congressional committees and their
members are entitled to immunity under Speech or Debate Clause); Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973) (same); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972)
(same). The power of Congress to create committees seems to have been assumed from
the beginning. The very first action of the first Senate, after counting the electoral votes
for President, was the creation of a rules committee. See I Annals of Cong. 18 (Apr. 7,
1789). Indeed, the Constitutional Convention itself utilized committees in the drafting of
the Constitution. See J. Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at
24 (committee on rules), 26 (rules for appointing committees) (A. Koch, ed. 1966).
87. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) ("receiving reports or other in-
formation... [is a function] that we have recognized generally as being incidental to the
legislative functions of Congress").
88. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
89. Id. at 617, 625.
90. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
91. See 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1988).
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their constituents on public matters." 92
The New York courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the
details of inherent legislative power. Indeed, because state legislatures
exercise general rather than enumerated powers, virtually all powers of
state legislatures are inherent rather than enumerated. The New York
Constitution provides only that "[t]he legislative power of this state shall
be vested in the senate and assembly," 93 and this grant of power serves as
the sole constitutional basis for most legislative action. Thus, the New
York Court of Appeals, like the Supreme Court, has held that the legisla-
ture possesses inherent authority to investigate, take testimony, issue sub-
poenas, punish contempt, and the like.94 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court relied in part on New York constitutional decisions in
reaching its own conclusions about the necessary scope of the inherent
legislative power of Congress.95
C. Constitutional Limits on Inherent Legislative Power
1. The Constitutional Landscape
The cases that define the boundaries of legislative power reveal an in-
herent legislative power that is broad and flexible, and which the legisla-
ture may readily adapt to permit it to perform its constitutionally
appointed functions as it understands them. Nevertheless, flexible
though this power may be, it is subject to significant constitutional limits.
Courts have explicitly identified at least three types of limitations.
First, inherent legislative power, like any other constitutional power, is
subject to the various express constitutional limitations designed to pro-
tect individual rights. The Supreme Court has thus held that congres-
sional investigations must be conducted consistent with the Bill of
Rights. Accordingly, the Court has overturned a conviction for con-
tempt of Congress on the ground that the investigating committee's au-
thority was so vague as to violate due process.96 It has also held that the
first amendment "of course reach[es] and limit[s] congressional investiga-
tions,"97 and has applied first amendment balancing to assess the consti-
tutionality of certain congressional investigations and questions to
witnesses. 98 The Court has also invalidated a state law conviction for
92. Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge
court), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983). Accord Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413, 429-30 (3d
Cir. 1974); Bowie v. Williams, 351 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also S. Rep.
No. 461, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2904, 2906 (explaining virtues of franking privilege).
93. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 1.
94. See Keeler v. McDonald, 99 N.Y. 463, 486-87, 2 N.E. 615, 627-28 (1885).
95. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 165-66 (1927).
96. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957).
97. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
98. See id. at 126-34. The Court's balancing in this case favored upholding the con-
viction of a witness who refused to answer certain questions about his political and reli-
gious beliefs put to him by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
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contempt of a state legislature on first amendment grounds. 9
Second, many of the circumstances that give rise to implied legislative
powers also give rise to implied limits on those powers. The power to
investigate, for example, derives from the power to legislate, a power
which Congress is entitled to attempt to exercise in an informed and in-
telligent manner. But, by the same token, the scope of the congressional
power to legislate sets the outer bounds of the accompanying congres-
sional power to investigate: "No inquiry," the Court has held, "is an end
in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of
the Congress."'0 For the most part, this means that Congress may in-
quire only into those areas in which it may potentially legislate."°' The
same limit applies in New York.0 2
Third, inherent legislative power is subject to implicit or structural
constitutional limitations that stake out the farthest reaches of legislative
power of any kind. The primary way in which legislatures have felt this
limitation is through application of the principle of separation of powers.
Thus, although Congress has the power to oversee the affairs of the exec-
utive branch, and although this oversight function provides a legitimate
basis for exercising the inherent congressional power of investigation,0 3
Congress cannot define its oversight function so broadly as to intrude on
activities constitutionally committed to the executive branch. For this
reason, Congress cannot confer on its chambers, committees, or legisla-
tors the power to "veto" exercises of the executive power undertaken
pursuant to law."° Similarly, the Court has noted that the congressional
powers to investigate and to punish contempt may not be utilized to
achieve goals constitutionally reserved for the judicial branch. Thus, ex-
cept in cases of impeachment, Congress cannot conduct trials by com-
mittee,'05 nor can it inflict punishment for the sake of punishing.' 6
Instead, its contempt powers may be wielded only insofar as they serve
legitimate legislative ends.'0 7 Again, the same limit based on separation
of powers has been held to apply to inherent legislative power in New
York. 08
99. See DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1966).
100. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
101. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 190-92 (1880).
102. See Keeler v. McDonald, 99 N.Y. 463, 485, 2 N.E. 615, 626 (1885).
103. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
104. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983).
105. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 217 (1957); Marshall v. Gordon, 243
U.S. 521, 547-48 (1917); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880).
106. See Marshall, 243 U.S. at 542.
107. See id. at 548; In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670 (1897); Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at
196.
108. See Keeler v. McDonald, 99 N.Y. 463, 487, 2 N.E. 615, 628 (1885).
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2. Inherent Legislative Power in Ohrenstein
With this brief review of the nature of inherent legislative power in
mind, let us return to the Ohrenstein case itself. There, the New York
Legislature enacted laws authorizing the Senate to spend public funds to
hire staff who worked on the election campaigns of incumbent legislators
and other candidates chosen by the Minority Leader. The Court of Ap-
peals held this to be a proper exercise of legislative authority, essentially
on the ground that campaigning for reelection, or for the election of
members of a legislator's political party, is an "inherent part of the job of
an elected representative."'' 09
In one respect, the court's ruling seems unremarkable. If one responsi-
bility of an elected official is to campaign for reelection--or if the legisla-
ture may properly choose to define its functions to include
campaigning-it seems to follow that the legislature should have the in-
herent or implied powers necessary to accomplish that result. Given the
complexity of the modern legislative and electoral processes, the assign-
ment of aides to assist in the legislators' campaigning duties seems only a
necessary and entirely legitimate exercise of the underlying legislative
authority.
In another respect, however, the court's ruling is surprising and dis-
turbing. The ruling places the constitutional stamp of approval on a par-
ticularly virulent form of incumbency abuse; it treats the scope of
inherent legislative power as broad enough to encompass the power to
devote substantial public resources to the production of a particular
political outcome selected by a small group of incumbent legislators. A
result like this ought not to be reached unless it is compelled, and to get
there, the Court of Appeals took a broad view indeed of the inherent
power of the legislature to identify and accomplish its legislative duties.
In light of the constitutional limitations identified in the previous section,
it seems logical to ask: has the court overstated the bounds of legitimate
inherent legislative authority? Unfortunately, the three types of constitu-
tional limitations mentioned earlier are rather unpromising bases for re-
stricting the ability of the legislature to hire staff to work on political
campaigns.
First, because there is no direct, express constitutional limit on the use
to which the New York Legislature can put its staff, only general consti-
tutional restrictions could, if applicable, prevent the use of staff for
campaigning. The most promising of these restrictions seems to be the
equal protection clause, 110 which has been invoked to invalidate laws and
governmental practices that systematically favor incumbents over chal-
lengers in election contests."' On further examination, however, the
109. Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 47, 565 N.E.2d at 497, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
110. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
29 (1968). The New York Constitution also contains an equal protection clause, N.Y.
Const. art. I, § 11, but it has been interpreted by New York courts to be generally
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equal protection analysis turns out to beg the real question. In order to
avoid offending the equal protection clause, a law must advance, to a
constitutionally determined degree, a legitimate government interest of
some constitutionally prescribed strength." 2 In the case of the laws in-
voked in Ohrenstein, that interest would presumably be the legislative
interest in campaigning effectively for reelection. But it is impossible to
evaluate the strength of such a government interest for equal protection
purposes without first determining whether the interest in seeking reelec-
tion is a legitimate and important one for a legislature to pursue-the
very question at issue here. Thus, although it is of potential interest," '
the equal protection clause is unable itself to provide the answer to the
question of whether the use of public funds to seek reelection is a legiti-
mate exercise of inherent legislative power." 4
The second type of limitation on inherent legislative power-implied
limits that arise from the circumstances giving rise to the underlying
power itself-seems equally unpromising. As an initial matter, it is far
from clear exactly what aspect of the power to legislate might give rise to
an implied power to use the legislative office to seek reelection. Such an
inference can hardly be justified, for example, on the ground that inher-
ent in the power to legislate is the power to continue to legislate; the
legislature itself continues to exist and to exercise legislative power re-
gardless of the identity of the individual legislators themselves. In any
event, if there is some reasonable basis for thinking that the power to
seek reelection is an inherent legislative power, it seems highly unlikely
that hiring aides to assist in that process will exceed some accompanying
implicit limitation. The Supreme Court has held that legislators and
their aides may be treated as identical for many important legislative pur-
poses, i15 and the New York courts have largely followed the Supreme
equivalent to the federal clause. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512,
530-31, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949), cerL denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
112. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) ("Under 'traditional'
equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained unless it... bears
no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.") with Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (under strict scrutiny standard, laws must be "necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest").
113. For a slightly different analysis of the constitutionality under the equal protection
clause of legislative use of staff for campaigning, see Note, Use of Congressional Staff in
Election Campaigning, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 998, 1010-14 (1982). See also Hoellen v. An-
nunzio, 468 F.2d 522, 525-26 (7th Cir. 1972) (then-Circuit Judge John Paul Stevens
wrote: "A legislator's desire to retain his public office or to obtain another is laudable
and should be encouraged, not demeaned. Implicit in a representative democracy is the
assumption that such motivation will provide a wholesome influence on legislative action
as well as incentive for the numerous related functions which legislators properly and
legitimately perform in an effort to serve their constituents well." (footnote omitted)),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
114. See generally Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982)
(discussing the practical limitations of the equality principle).
115. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972).
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Court's lead in this area.' 16 Moreover, with the possible exception of the
actual casting of votes on the chamber floor, it is hard to imagine a legis-
lative power that may be exercised inherently by legislators but not dele-
gated to their closest aides.
The third limitation on inherent legislative power, the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers, is simply inapplicable here: there can be no basis for
arguing that acting in pursuit of reelection to the legislature is more a
judicial or executive function than it is a legislative one. If campaigning
for a seat in the legislature is characteristic of the functions of any gov-
ernmental branch, that branch can only be the legislature.
Is there, then, no constitutional limit to the power of the legislature to
use public resources to seek its own reelection? Had the Court of Ap-
peals fully analyzed the pertinent questions of inherent legislative power,
would it nonetheless have been forced to conclude that it lacked any ba-
sis for reining in the abuse of incumbency practiced by the Minority
Leader and his codefendants? Fortunately, the answer is no. There is a
fourth type of constitutional limitation that restricts the scope of inherent
legislative power-the system of equality of political opportunity built
into the constitutional scheme itself.
D. Equality of Political Opportunity as a Structural Constraint on
Inherent Legislative Power
1. Legal Force of the Model
Implicit in the Constitution is a model of equality of political opportu-
nity that derives from the concept of republican self-government and that
condemns political abuse of the powers of incumbency.'1 7 If this model
has any kind of constitutional force-if it is anything more than an inter-
esting observation about the constitutional scheme-then it could poten-
tially serve as a concrete limitation on inherent legislative power
sufficient to prevent the type of incumbency abuse at issue in Ohrenstein.
Does this principle of republican government have constitutional force?
There is more than ample reason to believe that it does.
It is true that there is no provision of the United States or New York
constitutions that expressly bars the legislature from violating the princi-
ple of equal political opportunity when defining and then pursuing what
it takes to be its proper legislative duties. Express constitutional limita-
tions, however, are only one of three distinct and powerful kinds of limits
on inherent legislative power identified and applied by courts. The other
two types of limits are implicit in the constitutional scheme, arising from
116. Ohrenstein III was apparently the first decision of the Court of Appeals to con-
strue the state's Speech or Debate Clause. See Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 54, 565
N.E.2d at 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 752. The court relied exclusively on decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in analyzing the Clause. See id. at 53, 565 N.E.2d at 501,
563 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
117. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
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the nature of legislative power and from structural limits implicit in the
constitutional system of separation of powers.
Indeed, the notion of equal political opportunity can be said to arise
from a constitutional separation of powers just as real and just as signifi-
cant as the traditional tripartite division of governmental powers; here,
though, the relevant separation is not the separation of powers among
the different branches of government, but the separation of powers be-
tween the government and the people themselves. The deliberate deci-
sion of the people to create a republican form of government rather than
some other form reflects a popular desire to exercise control over govern-
ment officials by retaining the power to select those officials in elections.
For the people simultaneously to grant the legislature the power to take
significant steps to perpetuate itself in office would undermine the very
decisions reflected in the choice of a republican form of government.""
Thus, the principle of equality of political opportunity is in at least this
one sense a structural constitutional limit no different from the kinds of
structural limits routinely enforced by both federal and New York
courts.
Moreover, courts have on several occasions expressed principles much
like the one invoked here, albeit in slightly different contexts. The
Supreme Court has a long history of recognizing the important structural
role played by popular sovereignty-the power of the people to control
the government through the electoral process-in the constitutional
scheme. As early as McCulloch v. Maryland,"9 the Court drew upon
general principles of republican government implicit in the constitutional
structure to identify significant limits on the taxing power of the states. 2
In the much more recent case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,'21 the Court also relied on general principles of repub-
lican government to deduce that any constitutional limits on the federal
commerce power were enforceable primarily through the political pro-
cess. Significantly, the Court hinted that "failings in the national polit-
ical process" might prompt it to take a more active role in policing the
118. The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is generally said to be the pro-
tection of liberty. See The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.
1961); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The separation of powers is
thought to protect liberty by disabling any single branch or person from acquiring suffi-
cient power to pursue tyrannical ends. See The Federalist No. 47, supra, at 301-03. But
if the separation of powers among branches of government is important to liberty, the
separation of powers between government and the people must be even more so. Indeed,
the goal of protecting the people against encroachments by the government is coherent
only if accompanied by an antecedent distinction between the two in which the rights of
the governed are superior to those of the government. See also The Declaration of Inde-
pendence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (regarding the government's derivation of power from the
consent of the governed).
119. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
120. See id. at 425-37.
121. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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boundaries of the Commerce Clause. 12 2 Although the types of political
failings the Court referred to in Garcia were those involving the represen-
tation of state interests in Congress, the incumbency abuse at issue in
Ohrenstein poses a different but no less real threat to the state political
process. Under the reasoning of Garcia, judicial intervention to prevent
this form of incumbency abuse might well be required, even if the ordi-
nary constitutional methods for enforcing limits on inherent legislative
power were political.
In another, more directly pertinent context, the Supreme Court has
invoked a conception of constitutional limits on legislative power that is
similar to the limits embodied in the principle of equal political opportu-
nity. The notion that "legislatures are to make laws, not legislators,"' 23
implicit in the nature of legislative power in a republican government, is
the basis for the constitutional doctrine that Congress may not delegate
its legislative functions to other branches of government. 24 The idea
that the designation of legislators is beyond the power of the legislature
itself is rooted in the same republican scheme of representative democ-
racy as the model of equality of political opportunity; both derive from
the notion that the task of choosing legislators is one reserved for the
people alone, and in which the legislature may play no role.
A decision more directly on point is Shakman v. Democratic Organiza-
tion of Cook County.'25 There, the Seventh Circuit sustained a wide-
ranging challenge to the elaborate patronage and political practices of the
Chicago Democratic machine. One of the claims made by the plaintiffs,
party outsiders who sought to reform the abuses of the machine, was that
the patronage system provided the machine with an unfair advantage in
election contests. As the court put it, the allegations amounted to a
charge that the challenged practices "create a substantial, perhaps mas-
sive, political effort in favor of the ins and against the outs," and that this
violated the plaintiffs' constitutional right to "an equal chance" in local
elections.'26 In allowing the case to go forward, the court held that the
right to "an equal chance" was constitutionally protected, and that the
plaintiffs had therefore stated a claim.'27 This is as clear an endorsement
of the notion of a constitutionally enforceable doctrine of equal political
opportunity as one is likely to find, although whether Shakman would be
decided the same way today is open to question. 28
122. See id. at 554.
123. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-73, 686
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
124. See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-23 (1989); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935).
125. 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971), rev'd in part on
jurisdictional grounds sub nom. Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988).
126. Shakman, 435 F.2d at 270.
127. Id.
128. In a much later appeal, portions of the original Shakman decision were over-
turned for lack of standing. See Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387, 1392-99 (7th Cir.
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2. The Duties of Legislators
Even assuming that the doctrine of equality of political opportunity
has some constitutional force and may limit the scope of inherent legisla-
tive power, a potentially significant objection to its application in Ohren-
stein must be considered. The objection might go something like this.
The notion of equal political opportunity has no application here be-
cause, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, seeking and campaigning
for reelection is an integral part of the job of being a legislator; it is an
inherent function of legislators and legislative bodies which is itself im-
plicit in republican government. Because legislators by definition have
access to the resources of government, legislating, by its very nature, en-
compasses some degree of inequality of political opportunity. However,
the existence of this inequality is simply a necessary and unavoidable ef-
fect of the constitutional creation of a legislative body. As a result, any
constitutional doctrine of equal political opportunity can have no appli-
cation to the practices at issue in Ohrenstein.
This objection can also be couched in a somewhat weaker form that
does not go so far as to claim that legislating inherently encompasses the
duty to campaign for reelection. Suppose we grant that the model of
equal political opportunity provides a theoretical basis for distinguishing
abstractly between legislating and campaigning for reelection. Neverthe-
less, in practice, the two functions are so inseparably intertwined that
there is no way to regulate the latter without impinging unacceptably on
the former. Any serious attempt to deprive legislators of the opportunity
to use the advantages available to them as incumbents would have the
highly undesirable effect of crippling their ability to perform effectively
the various functions that fall within the proper domain of the legislative
process.
These are objections that legislatures themselves have taken seriously,
and have invoked from time to time as reasons for resisting reform of the
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988). This suggests, of course, that the entire case as
originally brought might today be dismissed in light of post-1970 developments in the law
of standing. More fundamentally, though, the 1970 Shakman decision probably repre-
sents the high-water mark of judicial policing of the electoral process, a trend that the
Court seems to have reversed. Compare Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 52
(1970) (expanding reach of one-person, one-vote requirement) and Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 481-83 (1968) (same) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568
(1964) (same) with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-80 (1980) (declining to
expand reach of the requirement). See also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294-300 (1981) (striking down laws designed to reduce electoral
advantage of candidates and ballot initiatives derived from imbalanced financial support);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-95 (1978) (same); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam) (same). However, a very recent case suggests that the
court may be on the verge of reassuming more responsibility for policing the electoral
system. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, - (1990) (ac-
knowledging for first time "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth" on the political process).
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legislative process."' Ultimately, though, the objections are unpersua-
sive. In its strong form, the objection confuses actual legislative practices
with legitimate ones. The weak form of the objection, though potentially
powerful in some circumstances, carries little weight in this case because
using public resources for private campaigning is an activity that is easily
distinguished from legitimate legislative activity, and is therefore, at least
in its more extreme manifestations, susceptible to practical regulation.
Political and legislative activities are often intertwined in our system of
government, and as a result it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish
legislating from campaigning. When incumbent legislators run for re-
election, their legislative records are legitimate campaign issues. The
way legislators vote, their attendance records, their influence with col-
leagues, and their committee assignments, to name just a few, are all
factors which voters may for good reason wish to consider when it comes
time to decide whether to reelect particular individuals for another term.
Consequently, almost everything legislators do in the normal course of
business affects their reelection fortunes in some way. Moreover, the
converse is also true: promises candidates make during campaigns and
the platforms or programs they endorse exercise a strong influence on the
way they conduct legislative business when elected. All this is an integral
and expected part of the political process in a republic.
Legislators also perform other tasks besides participating in the law
making process proper, and these tasks, which are generally considered
appropriate activities for legislators, can also affect their prospects for
reelection. For instance, legislators routinely try to keep their constitu-
ents informed of their activities. This "informing function"'130 is often
considered to play an important role in the legislative process in a de-
mocracy, where the people are supposed to exercise ultimate control over
the activities of the government. 131 Similarly, legislators often solicit the
views of their constituents on business before the legislature, again on the
129. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1380-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (reviewing United States Senate's deliberations concerning restricting cam-
paign activities of Senate staff, and concluding that Senate has been reluctant to impose
such restrictions in part because of the difficulty of distinguishing campaigning from
other official duties of staff); Ohrenstein II, supra note 31, at 364, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 975
(New York Legislature affirms that "[t]he official duties of a legislative employee, the
adequacy of performance thereof and the compensation therefore are the exclusive pre-
rogatives of the Legislature.").
130. The phrase "informing function" was apparently coined by Woodrow Wilson in
an influential 1885 work examining the workings of Congress. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132 (1979).
131. The Supreme Court has held that the congressional practice of keeping constitu-
ents informed of activities in Congress is not part of the "core" legislative activity entitled
to immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. See infra notes 164-68 and accompany-
ing text. Although the Court has deemed such activities to be "legitimate," see United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972), and "helpful," see Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at
133 n. 15, the strongest approval for this aspect of the informing function has come from
the lower courts. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D.D.C.
1982) (three-judge court); Bowie v. Williams, 351 F. Supp. 628, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
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theory that legislators, as representatives of the people, owe their princi-
pals a duty of consultation on important matters. But every communica-
tion with constituents places legislators in the public eye and creates the
impression that they are working diligently as representatives, both of
which inevitably enhance their prospects for reelection. The same is true
of public appearances such as speeches delivered outside the legislature,
and of the wide variety of services legislators often perform for their con-
stituents-helping constituents solve problems encountered when dealing
with government agencies, for example.
These close connections between legislative and campaign activities
have only been strengthened by the commonplace practice of elevating
political parties and their officers to quasi-governmental status. For ex-
ample, despite the fact that the United States Constitution makes no
mention of political parties, Congress has chosen to organize itself for
many official purposes along party lines. Thus, Congress has written the
positions of Majority and Minority Leader of the Senate and House of
Representatives into law, and provided that these officers may be paid a
higher salary than other members of Congress.' 32 It has also specifically
authorized the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate to hire em-
ployees and consultants,133 and to undertake various responsibilities con-
ceming foreign legislative bodies and officials of foreign governments.'3
Congress has also by law granted special privileges to the Majority and
Minority Whips. 135 Further, the Senate has by rule authorized the Ma-
jority and Minority Leaders to exercise continuing review over various
Senate rules.1 36 The New York Legislature has structured itself along
similar lines through a mixtures of laws and rules. 137
The institutionalization of party organization within the legislature it-
self, backed by force of law, inevitably draws into the legislative process
political concerns transcending that process. Modem American political
parties are huge associations of citizens and government officials organ-
ized to achieve a great variety of political and social goals. Political par-
ties often have agendas that call for the achievement of change over a
long period of time--certainly far longer than a single legislative ses-
sion-and in areas not always directly subject to legislative control. Part
of a political party's agenda may therefore include developing and imple-
Hoellen v. Annunzio, 348 F. Supp. 305, 315 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 522 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
132. 2 U.S.C. § 31(1)(B) (1988).
133. 2 U.S.C. §§ 61h-4 to -6 (1988).
134. 2 U.S.C. § 31a-2(a) (1988).
135. 2 U.S.C. §§ 31a-1, 61j-2 (1988).
136. See Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin., Senate Manual, S. Doe. No. 1, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 79.20 (1987).
137. See N.Y. Legis. Law §§ 5-a, 6(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991); New York State Sen-
ate, Rules of the Senate, 1989-90, Rule II, §§ 1-4; New York State Assembly, Rules of
the Assembly, 1989-90, Rule I, § 1, Rule IV, §§ 1(b), 2(b).
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menting strategies for long-term political and electoral dominance. 13
When key legislative officers are also key officials in political parties, the
business of the legislature becomes organized along party lines, and the
achievement of legislative goals may become intimately tied up with the
achievement of partisan goals-legislative accomplishments become par-
tisan accomplishments, and vice versa. All this makes it that much more
difficult to distinguish activities of legislators designed to achieve legisla-
tive goals from those designed to achieve partisan political advantages.
However, just because legislating and campaigning may sometimes
overlap does not mean that they are inseparable for any purpose. Quite
the opposite seems to be the case; courts and legislatures rather routinely
make fine distinctions between legislative and other activities, and not
infrequently require that campaigning be conducted under different con-
ditions than legislating.
In a series of cases decided under the Speech or Debate Clause, 139 the
Supreme Court has developed a highly refined conception of what consti-
tutes the type of "core" legislative activity protected by the Clause. The
Court has held repeatedly that the Constitution contemplates a very ba-
sic legislative process consisting exclusively of those activities that may
eventually result in the passage of a law."' This constitutional model of
the legislative process provides the basis for distinguishing core legisla-
tive activities entitled to immunity under the Clause from other activities
which, no matter how desirable in their own right, are nevertheless dis-
pensable from a constitutional point of view. Thus, the Court has held
that making a speech on the floor of Congress is part of the core legisla-
tive process,"' but making a speech to the general public is not. 4 2 A
subcommittee investigation is also part of the core legislative process, 43
but communicating with an executive agency is not.' 44 These cases,
138. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Re-
forms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1607-09 (1988).
139. See U.S. Const. art. I., § 6, cl. 1.
140. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 126-33 (1979); Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1972).
141. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 130.
142. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 133.
143. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1975);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951).
144. See Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1240 (1988). The lower courts have further elaborated these distinctions. For ex-
ample, lower courts have held that the allocation of limited press seating in the congres-
sional gallery is within the sphere of core legislative activity protected by the Speech or
Debate Clause, Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341,
1348-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976), as is the hiring of legislative
press officers. See Agromayor v. Colberg, 738 F.2d 55, 58-59 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1037 (1984). The firing of a committee stenographer is also an activity within the
legislative core, Browning v. Clerk, 789 F.2d 923, 929-30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 996 (1986), but the firing of the manager of the House of Representatives restaurant
is not. See Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Davis v. Pass-
man, 442 U.S. 228, 236 n. 11 (1979) (declining to decide whether congressman's firing of
aide was immune under Clause).
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which the New York courts follow, suggest that courts have had no diffi-
culty in the past distinguishing legislative from non-legislative activities.
Indeed, although the issue has never been squarely decided, it seems clear
that the Supreme Court would have no trouble concluding that
campaigning is not a part of the core legislative process entitled to consti-
tutional immunity. 45
Another area in which courts frequently and explicitly distinguish leg-
islative from campaign activity is the franking privilege. Congress has by
statute authorized its members to use the United States mail without
charge for "the conduct of the official business, activities, and duties of
the Congress of the United States."'" In the franking statute, Congress
has defined its official duties more broadly than the Supreme Court has
defined them in the Speech or Debate Clause cases;1 47 for example, the
frank is available for "conveying of information to the public, and the
requesting of the views of the public, or the views and information of
other authority of government"' 44-activities the Court has held to be
outside the constitutionally protected legislative core. 4 9 However, Con-
gress has also provided that the frank is not available for "mail matter
which specifically solicits political support for the sender or any other
person or any political party, or a vote or financial assistance for any
candidate for any public office."' 0 Thus, the public will by law pick up
the tab for material mailed for legitimate legislative purposes, as Con-
gress defines them, but not for material mailed for the purpose of
campaigning. Mailing costs for campaign material must be borne by the
legislator individually.
The statutory distinction between legislating and campaigning created
by the franking law has put the federal courts into the business of decid-
ing when a congressional mailing serves legitimate official purposes and
when it constitutes prohibited campaigning for office. Although courts
deciding cases under the franking statute have recognized that "it simply
is impossible to draw and enforce a perfect line between the official and
political business of Members of Congress[,]'"' they have nevertheless
145. This issue is considered more fully later. See infra notes 161-71 and accompany-
ing text.
146. 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(1) (1988).
147. For criticism of the Court's narrow view of Speech or Debate Clause immunity,
see Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: the New Interpretation
as a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1019, 1024-25, 1040-46 (1974);
Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 Va.
L. Rev. 175, 184-91 (1973); Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege a~d the Separa-
tion of Powers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1171-77 (1973).
148. 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(2) (1988).
149. The Court has expressly noted that the "[p]rovision for the use of the frank...
cannot expand the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause to render immune all that ema-
nates via such helpful facilities." Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.15 (1979).
150. 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(5)(C) (1988).
151. Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672, 683 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge
court), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983).
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from time to time held the use of the frank improper.' 5 2 In adjudicating
cases under the franking statute, courts have not shrunk from making
subtle distinctions. In one case, the court held that the same mailing was
proper under the franking statute when sent to one group of citizens, and
improper when sent to another group. In Hoellen v. Annunzio,' s3 a con-
gressman whose election district had been redrawn sent questionnaires to
residents of the redrawn district. The court held that the mailing was
proper insofar as it reached residents of wards within the redrawn dis-
trict that were also within the old district-that is, citizens whom the
incumbent congressmen then represented. However, the court held that
the mailing was improper insofar as it reached residents of wards that the
congressman did not then represent, but hoped to represent if returned to
office from the new district. These mailings, the court held, constituted
pure campaigning.
In perhaps the most blunt judicial decision to address the point, the
California Court of Appeal held: "The use of state employees by a legis-
lator's campaign committee to solicit contributions, plan campaign strat-
egy, coordinate volunteers, and prepare the campaign budget, all at state
expense, is in no way a proper part of a legislator's official functions; that
is not to be questioned."' 54 The court accordingly ruled that the per-
formance of campaign duties by a legislative employee at public expense
constituted a "contribution" by the legislature to the reelection campaign
of the legislator who received the employee's services, and therefore fell
within the reporting requirements of California's Political Reform
Act. 155
Courts are not the only bodies that occasionally distinguish the legisla-
tive activities of legislators from their campaign activities. Many legisla-
tures, including Congress and the New York Legislature, have adopted
internal rules that recognize the distinction between campaigning and
legislating and that take steps to keep the two separate.' 56 Indeed, some
of these regulations concern the use of legislative staff, the very issue in
152. See Hoellen v. Annunzio, 348 F. Supp. 305, 313-16 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 468 F.2d
522 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Rising v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824,
826-27 (C.D. Cal. 1970). In other cases, the use of the frank has been sustained against
claims that the privilege was abused. See Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413, 428-31 (3d
Cir. 1974); Bowie v. Williams, 351 F. Supp. 628, 632-34 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Van Hecke v.
Reuss, 350 F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Straus v. Gilbert, 293 F. Supp. 214, 216
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
153. 348 F. Supp. 305, 313-16 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
154. Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 130, 153 Cal. Rptr.
311, 314 (3d Dist. 1979).
155. Id. at 130-31, 153 Cal Rptr. at 314-15; see Cal. Gov't Code §§ 81000-16 (West
1987).
156. See, e.g., Senate Standing Rule 41. 1, in Senate Manual, supra note 136, at 77 ("No
officer or employee of the Senate may receive, solicit, be a custodian of, or distribute any
funds in connection with any campaign for the nomination for election, or the election, of
any individual to be a Member of the Senate or to any other Federal office."). See infra
notes 157-60.
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Ohrenstein. For example, the United States Senate has issued guidelines
to Senators stating that staff "are compensated from public funds for
their official congressional duties rather than for campaign services."'' 57
The House of Representatives ethics manual similarly provides that staff
"may not be compensated from public funds to perform nonofficial, per-
sonal, or campaign activities on behalf of the Member."' And the New
York Legislature, partly in response to the events of Ohrenstein, adopted
a concurrent resolution in 1987 which stated: "It is hereby established as
the rule of the Legislature that no person shall be hired by the Legisla-
ture to engage solely in political campaign activity."'159
Even if these limitations are enforceable only internally by the legisla-
ture, or are not intended to be enforced at all, they nevertheless reveal
two beliefs of these legislative bodies. First, the legislatures that adopted
these restrictions clearly believed that campaigning and legislating are
distinct activities, regardless of the extent to which they may overlap. '"
Second, the legislatures believed that the distinction between legislative
and campaign activities is sufficiently clear to form the basis for practical
decisions by individual legislators concerning the use and payment of
staff members.
All this points to two conclusions. First, there is no good constitu-
157. Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin., Senate Election Law Guidebook, S. Doc.
No. 25, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1988) [hereinafter Senate Election Law Guidebook].
158. House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, Ethics Manual for Members and
Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 84 (1987) [herein-
after House Ethics Manuall.
159. New York Legislature, Concurrent Resolution 812, quoted in Chrenstein II,
supra note 31, at 364, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 975. Several other states have passed laws prohib-
iting the expenditure of public funds or the use of public property for the purpose of
assisting candidates for political office. See e.g., Ala. Code Ann. § 17-1-7(c) (1988) ("No
person in the employment of the state ... shall use any state funds, property or time, for
any political activities."); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-116(l)(a), (3) (1990) (no agency contri-
butions to political campaigns; candidates must reimburse state for public money spent
on campaigns); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 106.15(2) (West Supp. 1991) (no use by candidates of
state aircraft or vehicles for campaigning; must prorate expenses if used for dual pur-
poses); Ga. Code Ann. § 50-19-8 (1990) (no use of vehicles); Iowa Code Ann. § 721.4
(West 1979) (no use of state-owned vehicles); Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.432(2) (1986) (no polit-
ical activity by state employees "while on the job during working hours"); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 2-19-206 (1985) (no use of public facilities for display of campaign literature);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.130 (1991) (no use of public facilities). In Louisiana, the
prohibition is constitutional. See La. Const., art. XI, § 4 (1977) ("No public funds shall
be used to urge any elector to vote for or against any candidate or proposition.").
160. It is also true, however, that these legislatures have not necessarily thought that it
is always easy to tell the difference between campaigning and legislating or to keep the
two distinct. Both the Senate and House of Representatives have raised the possibility of
"arguably unavoidable, 'overlap' or intrusion of some minimal campaign related activities
into the official operation of a Member's office." Senate Election Law Guidebook, supra
note 157, at 262; House Ethics Manual, supra note 158, at 87. In such cases, the Member
is directed to keep such overlap to a de minimus level. See id. The New York Legislature
has also indicated that it is proper for staff to engage in some campaign activities, but not
if such activities interfere with the performance of official duties. See also Ohrenstein II,
supra note 31, at 346, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 975 (quoting § 5 of Concurrent Resolution 812).
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tional basis for thinking that campaigning for reelection is such an inte-
gral part of the duties of incumbent legislators that it cannot be restricted
without impairing some important legislative function. To the extent
that incumbents actually do campaign for reelection, they are doing
something other than the legislative tasks assigned to them by virtue of
their holding constitutional office. Second, although the intertwining of
legislative and campaign activities is significant and unavoidable in many
areas, it is not so completely unavoidable, where the use of legislative
staff is concerned, as to preclude all regulation. A legislator may be com-
pelled to hire aides, and may unavoidably derive political benefits from
the activities of those aides; but no legislator is compelled for any legiti-
mate legislative reason to hire aides to spend all or most of their time on
the legislator's reelection campaign. Consequently, a line distinguishing
legislating from campaigning may be drawn somewhere without doing
fatal damage to legislators' abilities to perform legislative duties, and it
can certainly be drawn at the point where staff are assigned to work full
time on campaigns, as was the case in Ohrenstein.
IV. JUSTICIABILITY
One final issue remains to be considered. Even assuming that there are
constitutional limits on the scope of inherent legislative power, and that
the conduct of the Ohrenstein defendants transgressed those limits, it
does not necessarily follow that courts have the power to enforce those
limits. There are two potential barriers to justiciability in Ohrenstein:
the Speech or Debate Clause of the New York Constitution, and the
political question doctrine. Neither one, however, is an obstacle to judi-
cial review given the circumstances of the case.
A. Speech or Debate Clause Immunity
Much like its federal counterpart, the New York Speech or Debate
Clause provides: "For any speech or debate in either house of the legisla-
ture, the members shall not be questioned in any other place."'' The
main purpose of this provision, which is rooted in the seventeenth-cen-
tury English struggle between Parliament and the Crown,162 is to create
a constitutional immunity allowing legislators to perform their duties
free from interference by other branches of government. 63
The New York Court of Appeals has construed the New York Speech
161. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 11. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
162. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951). See also Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 147, at 1120-44 (discussion of the historical development of the
Constitution's speech or debate privilege).
163. See Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 53, 565 N.E.2d at 500-01, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
751-52; accord United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1966) (discussing the
legislative privilege to be free from interference by the Judiciary and Executive branches).
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or Debate Clause to have the same meaning as the federal version, 6' so
the rulings of the federal courts are a reliable guide to the meaning of the
New York Clause. The Supreme Court has been quite specific about
what activities of legislators are entitled to the immunity conferred by the
Clause. Only acts "done in Congress in relation to the business before
it,",165 the Court has held, fall within the scope of constitutional immu-
nity. Such acts
must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in committee and [congres-
sional] proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation.... 66
The scope of this immunity is quite narrow. The Court has emphasized
that the Clause does not protect "all things in any way related to the
legislative process," because virtually anything a legislator does could fall
within that definition. 67 Rather, the Clause protects only those activities
"within the legislative core."' 8 As noted earlier, the Court has specifi-
cally held that certain activities commonly performed by legislators, such
as informing and communicating with constituents, are outside the pro-
tected legislative core.'69
In light of these holdings, it is highly unlikely that the Court would
consider acts associated with campaigning for reelection to be immune
under the Clause. Campaigning for reelection does not relate to the busi-
ness before the legislature, but to the business before the electorate. It is
no part at all, much less an integral part, of the process by which pro-
posed legislation is considered, for the outcome of an election is not legis-
lation, but legislators. Indeed, the legislature could carry on its business
without any impairment at all (and perhaps could carry on more effec-
tively) even if legislators were constitutionally barred from succeeding
themselves in office, and thus were ineligible to campaign while holding
office. 170
Finally, in the portion of the Ohrenstein opinion dealing with the no-
show employees, the Court of Appeals itself noted that Speech or Debateimmunity "does not extend to acts which a legislator performs to secure
support in the community or to insure reelection."' 7' Thus, the Speech
or Debate Clause does not bar judicial enforcement of constitutional lim-
its on inherent legislative power as they relate to the use of staff for cam-
paign purposes.
164. See Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 53-54, 565 N.E.2d at 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
752.
165. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
166. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
167. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516.
168. Browning v. Clerk, 789 F.2d 923, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
169. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.
170. This is the case for the Governor of Virginia, who is constitutionally barred from
serving two consecutive terms. See Va. Const. art. V, § 1.
171. Ohrenstein III, supra note 6, at 54, 565 N.E.2d at 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
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B. The Political Question Doctrine
The other potential bar to the justiciability of legislative transgressions
of constitutional limits on inherent legislative power is the political ques-
tion doctrine. That doctrine, rooted in the constitutional separation of
powers, precludes courts from deciding cases that require the resolution
of certain types of questions which the judiciary is poorly equipped to
resolve. 7' The Supreme Court has identified six instances in which the
political question doctrine bars judicial review of government actions;
these include a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department" and "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" a question. 173
In the only other case besides Ohrenstein to consider the propriety of
the use of legislative staff for campaigning, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the political ques-
tion doctrine barred judicial review. In United States ex rel. Joseph v.
Cannon,174 a private plaintiff brought a qui tam action under the False
Claims Act 175 to recover public funds spent by an incumbent Senator to
pay an aide who for nine months allegedly worked exclusively on the
Senator's reelection campaign. The court held the action barred by the
political question doctrine due to a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards.' 76 The court based its ruling on the absence of
statutory, administrative, and case law addressing the propriety of the
use of congressional staff for campaign purposes, and on what it deemed
the inability of the Senate itself to decide the question in its internal
deliberations. 177
Because the assignment of duties to legislative staff seems so intimately
a part of the internal self-governance of a coordinate branch of govern-
ment, the decision of the court in Cannon to stay out of the dispute
makes at least superficial sense. Upon further examination, however,
there are three good reasons to reject the court's conclusion. 178 First, the
court completely ignored the constitutional standards that constrain the
scope of inherent legislative power. Legal standards established by the
Constitution itself are more than sufficient to make a case judicially man-
ageable within the meaning of the political question doctrine. 179
172. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998-1000 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
173. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
174. 642 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982).
175. See 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1988).
176. The New York Appellate Division relied on Cannon to reach a similar conclusion
with respect to some of the counts in Ohrenstein. However, this part of the Appellate
Division's opinion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on different grounds. See
Ohrenstein II, supra note 31, at 356-69, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 970-77.
177. See Cannon, 642 F.2d at 1379-84.
178. A fourth reason, not discussed here, is that the court simply erred in concluding
that the Senate was ambivalent about the use of staff in reelection campaigns. A persua-
sive case to this effect is made in Note, supra note 113, at 1018-24.
179. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
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Second, the very thing that makes the political question doctrine ulti-
mately justifiable-the availability of a political check on the legislative
and executive branches-is missing under the circumstances of Ohren-
stein. An important, and perhaps paramount, function of the judicial
branch is to enforce constitutional norms against the political branches of
government.' 80 The political question doctrine relies on the notion that
certain types of issues are better resolved by the political branches them-
selves, but that does not mean that those branches are then unaccounta-
ble for any transgressions of constitutional norms. Accountability to the
judiciary is not the only type of accountability: the legislative and execu-
tive branches are always accountable to the people directly at the
polls."' However, this assumption breaks down when the actions taken
by those branches, actions claimed to be sheltered from review by the
political question doctrine, tend to undermine the political check itself.
Here, the legislature has used its staff to campaign precisely in order to
obtain an advantage in the election, and this advantage weakens the abil-
ity of the people to exercise an electoral check on those very legislative
actions. Thus, legislative actions designed to perpetuate the power of the
legislature stand on a different footing from the types of actions for
which the political question doctrine is typically invoked. In these cir-
cumstances, courts should be extremely wary of invoking the doctrine
because they may be the only bodies capable of curbing the constitution-
ally offensive practice.'8 z
A final reason for rejecting the reasoning of Cannon is peculiar to the
circumstances of Ohrenstein. The political question doctrine flows in
part from the idea that separation of powers considerations caution
against judicial intrusions into the province of coordinate branches of
government. 8 3 The more intrusive the judicial inquiry, the less likely
the court is to undertake it.'" In Ohrenstein, the way in which the issue
of legislative staff use was presented made judicial resolution of the issue
as unintrusive as it could possibly be: all the court had to do was con-
strue the statutes that the defendants claimed authorized them to hire
staff to do campaign work. Unlike the issuance of declarations or injunc-
tions, or the type of inquiry into the motivations of legislators potentially
implicated in Cannon, statutory construction is among the least intrusive
methods of judicial action. 8
180. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).
181. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551-55 (1985);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 197 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 428-34 (1819).
182. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554. See generally J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73-
179 (1980) (addressing the Court's role in political change).
183. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Cannon, 642 F.2d at 1379.
184. Thus, the Court will decline to adjudicate a case on political question grounds if
its resolution would "expresso lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment," or would require "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
185. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Jus-
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CONCLUSION
Abuse of the powers of incumbency for political gain is a serious of-
fense against the polity and against republican self-government itself. If
true, the allegations against the Minority Leader of the New York Senate
reveal a systematic pattern of legislative abuse that ought to be intolera-
ble under our form of government. In its decision in Ohrenstein, the
New York Court of Appeals not only failed to put a stop to these activi-
ties, but in essence put them beyond the reach of any branch of govern-
ment to prevent other than the legislature-the one entity that can least
be trusted to resist the temptation to use public resources to perpetuate
its own power.18 6
The court's decision rests on the misguided notion that the legislature
has virtually unlimited inherent power to define its own duties and to pay
assistants to accomplish them. In fact, inherent legislative power is sub-
ject to numerous constitutional limitations, including the structural con-
straint arising from the concept of equality of political opportunity
implicit in our system of republican government. The use of public re-
sources to obtain an electoral advantage offends this structural con-
straint, and is thus beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to
undertake.
The close relation in our political system between those activities of
legislators that promote their legislative interests and those that promote
their personal political fortunes gives incumbents an electoral advantage
over challengers that is to a certain extent unavoidable. That does not
mean, however, that all such advantages inevitably accompany incum-
bency, or that legislating and campaigning can never be differentiated.
The hiring of staff at public expense to work on reelection campaigns is
so clearly beyond the scope of activities integral to the legislative process
that courts should not hesitate to invalidate the practice. Moreover,
tice Powell argued that interpreting the Constitution does not imply a lack of respect for
the coordinate branches; it is the duty of courts to say what the law is. See id. See also
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969) (judicial interpretation of the Con-
stitution "falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law, and does
not involve a 'lack of respect due [a] coordinate [branch] of government'" (quoting
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217)); accord Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n. 11 (1979) (same).
If constitutional interpretation is sufficiently unintrusive to avoid creating a political
question, interpreting a statute must be even less so.
186. The only action the New York Legislature has taken thus far, even in response to
intense pressure from the public and from an extremely popular Governor, is Concurrent
Resolution 812, a modest and highly circumscribed reform. See Ohrenstein II, supra note
31, at 346, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 975. The Resolution says only that legislative staff may not
be hired to engage "solely" in campaign work. Id. The Resolution provides no means of
enforcing even this limited restriction, which, in any event, is easily evaded. Moreover,
the Resolution further undercuts the possibility of meaningful reform by expressly af-
firming that "[t]he official duties of a legislative Employee, the adequacy of performance
thereof and the compensation therefor are the exclusive prerogatives of the Legislature."
Id.
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neither the Speech or Debate Clause nor the political question doctrine
makes such legislative practices non-justiciable.
For now, the Legislature has decided, at least on paper, voluntarily to
curb the most egregious abuses of legislative staff. It remains to be seen
whether the court's decision in Ohrenstein, coupled perhaps with the
eventual election of a governor less interested in government ethics than
the incumbent, will undermine this legislative resolve, thereby paving the
way for a return to practices that have no legitimate place in a
democracy.

